traffic
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... 1], is designed to limit the impact of distributed
denial of service attacks, by denying traffic with spoofed addresses
access to the network ...
... addresses
access to the network, and to help ensure that traffic is traceable
to its correct source network. As a side effect of protecting the
...
... 2827 recommends that ISPs police their customers' traffic by
dropping traffic entering their networks ...
... customers' traffic by
dropping traffic entering their networks that is coming from a source
address not legitimately in use by the customer network ...
... customer network. The
filtering includes but is in no way limited to the traffic whose
source address is a so-called "Martian ...
... those machines to attack others with ICMP messages or other traffic;
in this case, the attacked sites can protect themselves by proper
filtering ...
... network and entering an ISP can be
limited to traffic it is legitimately sending, attacks can be
somewhat mitigated: traffic ...
... traffic it is legitimately sending, attacks can be
somewhat mitigated: traffic with random or improper source addresses
can be suppressed before it does significant damage, and attacks ...
... - and if the packet is received on the interface which would be used
to forward the traffic to the source of the packet, it passes the
check.
...
... under its policy, the effect is the same as ingress filtering using
an incomplete access list: some legitimate traffic is filtered for
lack of a route in the filtering ...
... routing protocols as well, to make strict RPF
work better in the case of asymmetric or multihomed traffic. The ISP
assigns a better metric which is not propagated outside of the
...
... network's traffic to traffic legitimately sourced from that network,
in most cases, rendering the mechanism useless as an ingress
filtering ...
... ISPs use default routes for various purposes such as
collecting illegitimate traffic at so-called "Honey Pot" systems or
discarding any traffic they do not have a "real" route ...
... collecting illegitimate traffic at so-called "Honey Pot" systems or
discarding any traffic they do not have a "real" route to, and
smaller ISPs ...
... mostly usable in scenarios where default routes are used only to
catch traffic with bogus source addresses, with an extensive (or even
full) list of explicit routes to cover legitimate traffic ...
... traffic with bogus source addresses, with an extensive (or even
full) list of explicit routes to cover legitimate traffic.
Like Loose RPF ...
... 6. Ensure that edge networks only deliver traffic to their ISPs that
will in fact pass the ingress filter ...
... filters (which they should do), the
third option is to route traffic being sourced from a given
provider's address space ...
... network for every prefix the network uses, traffic
originating from any other prefix can be summarily discarded instead
...
...
Ingress filtering is typically performed to ensure that traffic
arriving on one network interface legitimately comes from a computer
...
... more effective it is. One could wish that the first hop router would
ensure that traffic being sourced from its neighboring end system was
correctly addressed; a router further away can only ensure that it is
...
... ISP. In many cases, a simple strict RPF can be augmented by
operational procedures in the case of asymmetric traffic patterns,
or the feasible RPF technique to also account for other
...
...
o Specify the mechanisms in more detail: there is some variance
between implementations e.g., on whether traffic to multicast
destination addresses ...
... network has connectivity
with different properties (e.g., peers and upstreams), and wants
to ensure that traffic sourced with a peer's address should not be
accepted from the upstream ...