RFC 3761:The E.164 to Uniform Resource Identifiers...
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attack


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... institute actions which, while not directly harmful, may result in disclosure of information that either facilitates a subsequent attack or else violates the users privacy in some way. ...


... Internet, it is expected to be a popular target for various kind of attacks, and attacking the underlying DNS infrastructure is one way of attacking ...
... ENUM service itself. There are multiple types of attacks that can happen against DNS that ENUM ...
... DNS are various forms of packet interception: monkey-in-the-middle attacks, eavesdropping on requests combined with spoofed responses that beat the real response back to the resolver, and so forth. In any of these ...
... response back to the resolver, and so forth. In any of these scenarios, the attacker can simply tell either party (usually the resolver) whatever it wants that party to believe. While packet interception attacks ...
... attacker can simply tell either party (usually the resolver) whatever it wants that party to believe. While packet interception attacks are far from unique to DNS, DNS's usual ...
... query or response in a single unsigned, unencrypted UDP packet makes these attacks particularly easy for any bad guy with the ability to intercept packets on a shared or transit network ...
... client UDP port for a given client and server. Thus it is possible for a reasonable brute force attack to allow an attacker to masquerade ...
... client and server. Thus it is possible for a reasonable brute force attack to allow an attacker to masquerade as a trusted server ...
... masquerade as a trusted server. In most respects, this attack is similar to a packet interception attack except that it does not require the ...
... trusted server. In most respects, this attack is similar to a packet interception attack except that it does not require the attacker to be on a transit or shared network ...
... a packet interception attack except that it does not require the attacker to be on a transit or shared network. ...
... network. Name-based Attacks Name-based attacks use the actual DNS ...
... Name-based Attacks Name-based attacks use the actual DNS caching behavior as a tool ...
... victim's query to another location. The common thread in all of these attacks is that response messages allow the attacker to introduce arbitrary DNS names ...
... query to another location. The common thread in all of these attacks is that response messages allow the attacker to introduce arbitrary DNS names of the attacker ...
... attacker to introduce arbitrary DNS names of the attacker's choosing and provide further information that the attacker claims is associated ...
... DNS names of the attacker's choosing and provide further information that the attacker claims is associated with those names; unless the victim has better knowledge of the data associated with those names, the victim is going to have a ...
... data associated with those names, the victim is going to have a hard time defending against this class of attacks. Betrayal By A Trusted Server ...
... Betrayal By A Trusted Server Another variation on the packet interception attack is the trusted server that turns out not to be so trustworthy, whether by accident or by intent. Many client ...
... kind in any domain of discourse), DNS is vulnerable to denial of service attacks. DNS servers are also at risk of being used as denial of service ...
... such as DNSSEC [8] once it is deployed. Others, such and Denial Of Service attacks, cannot be solved by data authentication. It is important to remember that these threats include not only the NAPTR ...
... translation should not blindly trust that the peer is the intended party as all kind of attacks against DNS can not be protected against with DNSSEC ...



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