client
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...
For ENUM this specifies where a client is allowed to apply local
policy and where it is not. The Order field in the NAPTR is a
...
... suggestion from that E.164 holder that one record might be better
than another. A client implementing ENUM MUST adhere to the Order
field but can simply take the Preference value "on advisement" as
...
... ENUM MUST adhere to the Order
field but can simply take the Preference value "on advisement" as
part of a client context specific selection method.
...
... E.164
number. Since there are numerous dialing plans which can change over
time, it is probably impossible for a client application to have
perfect knowledge about every valid and dialable E.164 ...
... valid and dialable E.164 number.
Therefore a client application, doing everything within its power,
can end up with what it thinks is a syntactically correct E.164
...
... into the additional information section of the answer until the
packet reaches the maximum length allowed. It is therefore
potentially useful for a client to check for this additional
information. It is also easy to contemplate an ENUM enhanced
...
... resource records in the Additional Information portion of
the DNS packet. Clients are encouraged to check for additional
information but are not required to do so. See the Additional
Information Processing section of RFC 3403prop ...
... 3].
If a client encounters a record with an unknown flag, it MUST ignore
it and move to the next Rule. This test takes precedence over any
...
... non-terminal. If a
Rule is non-terminal then clients MUST use the Key produced by this
Rewrite Rule as the new Key in the DDDS loop (i.e., causing the
...
... Rewrite Rule as the new Key in the DDDS loop (i.e., causing the
client to query for new NAPTR records at the domain ...
... DNS is a well-known value,
there are only 2**32 possible combinations of ID and client UDP
port for a given client and server. Thus it is possible for a
reasonable brute force attack ...
... well-known value,
there are only 2**32 possible combinations of ID and client UDP
port for a given client and server. Thus it is possible for a
reasonable brute force attack to allow an attacker ...
... packet interception attack is the trusted
server that turns out not to be so trustworthy, whether by
accident or by intent. Many client machines are only configured
with stub resolvers, and use trusted servers to perform all of
their DNS queries ...
... trusted
server is furnished by the user's ISP and advertised to the client
via DHCP or PPP options ...