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RFC 3761:The E.164 to Uniform Resource Identifiers...
RFC-Ref

DNS


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... This document discusses the use of the Domain Name System (DNS) for storage of E.164 numbers. More specifically, how DNS ...
... DNS) for storage of E.164 numbers. More specifically, how DNS can be used for identifying available services connected to one E.164 ...
... 5], called within this document E.164 numbers, into DNS names and the use of existing DNS services ...
... E.164 numbers, into DNS names and the use of existing DNS services like delegation ...
... The domain "e164.arpa" is being populated in order to provide the infrastructure in DNS for storage of E.164 numbers. In order to facilitate distributed operations, this domain ...
... domain is divided into subdomains. Holders of E.164 numbers which want to be listed in DNS should contact the appropriate zone administrator according to the ...
... this information by examining the SOA resource record associated with the zone, just like in normal DNS operations. Of course, as with other domains ...
... The Order field in the NAPTR record specifies in what order the DNS records are to be interpreted. This is because DNS does not guarantee the order of records returned in the answer section of a ...
... The Order field in the NAPTR record specifies in what order the DNS records are to be interpreted. This is because DNS does not guarantee the order of records returned in the answer section of a DNS packet ...
... DNS does not guarantee the order of records returned in the answer section of a DNS packet. In most ENUM cases this isn't an issue because the typical regular expression ...


... Application is found in [2] which is the document that defines the NAPTR DNS Resource Record type. ENUM ...
... ENUM compliant applications MUST only query DNS for what it believes is an E.164 number. Since there are numerous dialing plans which can change over ...
... number which in reality is not actually valid or dialable. This implies that applications MAY send DNS queries when, for example, a user mistypes a number in a user interface. Because of this, there ...
... "Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS) Part Three: The DNS Database" (RFC 3403prop ...
... 2] specifies a DDDS Database that uses the NAPTR DNS resource record to contain the rewrite rules. The Keys for this database are encoded as domain ...
... flags field is blank, produces new keys in the form of domain-names from the DNS. Some nameserver ...
... nameserver implementations attempt to be intelligent about items that are inserted into the additional information section of a given DNS response. For example, BIND will attempt to determine if it is authoritative for a domain whenever it encodes one into a packet. If ...
... NAPTR records it is serving and inserts more appropriate information into the additional information section of the response. Thus, DNS servers MAY interpret Flag values and use that information to include appropriate resource records ...
... appropriate resource records in the Additional Information portion of the DNS packet. Clients are encouraged to check for additional information but are not required to do so. See the Additional ...
... information on NAPTR records and the Additional Information section of a DNS response packet. The character set ...
... allowed anywhere in an E.164 number. The characters allowed to be in a Key are those that are currently defined for DNS domain-names. ...


... DNS Security ...
... As ENUM uses DNS, which in its current form is an insecure protocol, there is no mechanism for ensuring that the data one gets back is authentic. As ENUM ...
... target for various kind of attacks, and attacking the underlying DNS infrastructure is one way of attacking the ENUM service itself. ...
... There are multiple types of attacks that can happen against DNS that ENUM implementations should be aware of. The following threats are ...
... Packet Interception Some of the simplest threats against DNS are various forms of packet interception: monkey-in-the-middle attacks ...
... resolver) whatever it wants that party to believe. While packet interception attacks are far from unique to DNS, DNS's usual behavior of sending an entire query ...
... packet interception attacks are far from unique to DNS, DNS's usual behavior of sending an entire query or response in a single ...
... ID Guessing and Query Prediction Since the ID field in the DNS header is only a 16-bit field and the server UDP port ...
... bit field and the server UDP port associated with DNS is a well-known value, there are only 2**32 possible combinations of ID and client UDP port ...
... Name-based Attacks Name-based attacks use the actual DNS caching behavior as a tool to insert bad data ...
... bad data into a victim's cache, thus potentially subverting subsequent decisions based on DNS names. Most examples occur with CNAME, NS ...
... attacks is that response messages allow the attacker to introduce arbitrary DNS names of the attacker's choosing and provide further information that the attacker ...
... client machines are only configured with stub resolvers, and use trusted servers to perform all of their DNS queries on their behalf. In many cases the trusted server is furnished by the user's ISP ...
... service of any kind in any domain of discourse), DNS is vulnerable to denial of service attacks. DNS servers are also at risk of being used as ...
... domain of discourse), DNS is vulnerable to denial of service attacks. DNS servers are also at risk of being used as denial of service amplifiers, since DNS response packets ...
... DNS servers are also at risk of being used as denial of service amplifiers, since DNS response packets tend to be significantly longer than DNS query packets. ...
... denial of service amplifiers, since DNS response packets tend to be significantly longer than DNS query packets. Authenticated ...
... trust that the peer is the intended party as all kind of attacks against DNS can not be protected against with DNSSEC. A service ...
... ENUM MUST be prepared to receive DNSSEC and other standardized DNS security responses, including large responses, EDNS0 signaling ...
... The caching in DNS can make the propagation time for a change take the same amount of time as the time to live for the NAPTR records ...


... Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS) Part Three: The Domain Name System (DNS) Database", RFC 3403prop, October 2002. ...



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