RFC 4085:Embedding Globally-Routable Internet Addr...
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Internet


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... network gear have unfortunately chosen to embed, or "hard-code", globally-routable Internet Protocol addresses within their products' firmware. These embedded IP addresses ...
... subnet identifiers, specifying sets of Internet addresses that the given product somehow treats specially. ...
... IP address of a Network Time Protocol server in the firmware of hundreds of thousands of Internet hosts that are now in operation worldwide. The hosts ...
... routers and middleboxes for personal or residential use. In another case, IP address prefixes that had once been reserved by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) were embedded in a router product ...
... within the host's firmware presents significant problems to the operation of the Internet and to the management of its address space. ...
... IP addresses initially may appear to be convenient to the product's designer and to its operator or user, but this dubious benefit comes at the expense of others in the Internet community. This document denounces the practice of embedding references to ...
... This document denounces the practice of embedding references to unique, globally-routable IP addresses in Internet hosts, describes some of the resulting problems, and considers selected alternatives. ...
... hosts, describes some of the resulting problems, and considers selected alternatives. It also reminds the Internet community of the ephemeral nature of unique, globally-routable IP addresses; the assignment and use of IP addresses ...


... The embedding of IP addresses in products has caused an increasing number of Internet hosts to rely on a single central Internet service. This can result in a service ...
... number of Internet hosts to rely on a single central Internet service. This can result in a service outage when the aggregate workload overwhelms that service ...
... reliability, scalability, and performance of many Internet services require that the pool of users not access a service using its IP address ...
... When IP addresses are embedded in the configuration of many Internet hosts, the IP address ...
... hosts, the IP address blocks become encumbered by their historical use. This may interfere with the ability of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and the Internet Registry (IR ...
... use. This may interfere with the ability of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and the Internet Registry (IR) hierarchy to usefully reallocate IP address ...
... IP address reuse, RFC 2050 [1], encourages Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to treat address ...
... Because consumers are not necessarily experienced in the operation of Internet hosts, they cannot be relied upon to fix problems, if and when they arise. Therefore, a significant responsibility lies with ...
... when they arise. Therefore, a significant responsibility lies with the manufacturer or vendor of an Internet host to avoid embedding IP addresses in ways that cause the aforementioned problems. ...


... Internet host and router designers, including network ...
... network product manufacturers, should not assume that their products will be deployed and used in only the single global Internet that they happen to observe today. A myriad of private or future internetworks in which these products will be used may not allow those hosts ...
... hosts to establish communications with arbitrary hosts on the global Internet. Since the product failure modes resulting from an unknown future internetwork environment cannot be fully explored, one should avoid ...
... the product failure modes resulting from an unknown future internetwork environment cannot be fully explored, one should avoid assumptions regarding the longevity of our current Internet. The following recommendations are presented as best practice ...
... Vendors should, by default, disable unnecessary features in their products. This is especially true of features that generate unsolicited Internet traffic. In this way, these hosts will be conservative regarding the unsolicited Internet traffic ...
... Internet traffic. In this way, these hosts will be conservative regarding the unsolicited Internet traffic they produce. For instance, one of the most common uses of embedded IP addresses ...
... Vendors should provide an operator interface for every feature that generates unsolicited Internet traffic. A prime example is this: the Domain Name System resolver should have an interface ...
... Internet hosts should use the Domain Name System to determine the IP addresses ...
... hosts should use the Domain Name System to determine the IP addresses associated with the Internet services they require. When using domain names ...
... service identifiers in the configurations of deployed Internet hosts, designers and vendors are encouraged to ...
... agreement with its operator (such as for public services provided by the Internet community). This is commonly done by introducing a service-specific prefix ...
... Default configurations, documentation, and example configurations for Internet hosts should use Internet addresses that reside within ...
... Internet hosts should use Internet addresses that reside within special blocks that have been reserved for these purposes, rather than unique, globally-routable IP addresses ...
... purposes RFC 3849 [4]. Private Internet Addresses, as defined by RFC 1918 ...
... Operators who provide public services on the global Internet, such as those in the NTP community, should deprecate the explicit ...


... host-based trust model is being employed, and that the Internet host with the given address is trusted in some way. Due ...
... be trusted inadvertently. Internet host designers may be tempted to implement some sort of remote control mechanism within a product, by which its Internet ...
... Internet host designers may be tempted to implement some sort of remote control mechanism within a product, by which its Internet host configuration can be changed without reliance on, interaction with, or even the knowledge of, its operator or user. This raises security issues ...


... When large numbers of homogeneous Internet hosts are deployed, it is particularly important that both their designers and other members of ...
... hosts are deployed, it is particularly important that both their designers and other members of the Internet community diligently assess host implementation quality and reconfigurability. ...


... Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and J. Postel, "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines", BCP 12, RFC 2050 ...
... Plonka, D., "Flawed Routers Flood University of Wisconsin Internet Time Server", August 2003. http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~plonka/netgear-sntp/ ...


... IP address 128.105.39.11, and hence produces a large scale flood of Internet traffic from hundreds of thousands of source addresses, destined for the University's network, resulting in ...
... These flawed routers are widely deployed throughout the global Internet and are likely to remain in use for years to come. As such, the University of Wisconsin, with the cooperation of NetGear, will build a new anycast ...
... Routers Flood University of Wisconsin Internet Time Server [11]. ...


... Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject ...
... AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ...
... OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION ...


... Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. ...



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