RFC 4261:Common Open Policy Service (COPS) Over Tr...
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TLS


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... domain boundaries. TLS [RFC2246] was designed to provide channel-oriented security. TLS ...
... TLS [RFC2246] was designed to provide channel-oriented security. TLS standardizes SSL and may be used with any connection-oriented ...
... connection-oriented service. TLS provides mechanisms for both one- and two-way authentication, dynamic session keying ...
... integrity. This document describes how to use COPS over TLS. "COPS over TLS" is abbreviated COPS ...
... This document describes how to use COPS over TLS. "COPS over TLS" is abbreviated COPS/TLS ...
... COPS over TLS" is abbreviated COPS/TLS. ...


... COPS/TLS - A secure implementation of COPS using TLS. ...
... COPS/TLS - A secure implementation of COPS using TLS. PDP ...


... COPS Over TLS ...
... COPS/TLS is very simple: use COPS over TLS similar to how you would use COPS ...
... COPS/TLS is very simple: use COPS over TLS similar to how you would use COPS over TCP ...
... to initialize the connection, there is no difference between COPS/TLS and COPS/TCP ...


... method for COPS/TLS. ...


... COPS/TLS Objects and Error codes ...
... error codes needed to support COPS/TLS. ...
... The TLS Message Integrity Object (Integrity-TLS) ...
... The TLS Message Integrity Object (Integrity-TLS) ...
... The TLS Integrity object is used by the PDP and the PEP to start ...
... PEP to start the TLS negotiation. This object should be included only in the Client- Open or Client-Accept messages ...
... This flag indicates that the sender of the message wishes to initiate a TLS handshake. ...
... PEP or PDP does not support TLS, the C-Num specified MUST be 16 and the C-Type MUST be 2. This ...
... C-Num specified MUST be 16 and the C-Type MUST be 2. This demonstrates that the TLS version of the Integrity object is not ...
... security-related connection closure if it cannot support a TLS connection for the COPS protocol. ...


... COPS/TLS Secure Connection Initiation ...
... Client-Accept message. Once the TLS connection is established, all COPS data MUST be sent as TLS ...
... TLS connection is established, all COPS data MUST be sent as TLS "application data". ...
... A PEP MAY initiate a TLS security negotiation with a PDP using the Client-Open message ...
... Client-Open message MUST have a Client-Type of 0 and MUST include the Integrity-TLS object. Upon receiving ...
... PDP SHOULD respond with a Client-Accept message containing the Integrity-TLS object. Note that in order to carry the Integrity-TLS object ...
... Integrity-TLS object. Note that in order to carry the Integrity-TLS object, the contents of the Client-Accept message defined in section 3.7 of [RFC2748 ...
... Client-Accept message, the PEP SHOULD initiate the TLS handshake. ...
... Client-Open (Client-Type = 0, Integrity-TLS) S: Client-Accept (Client ...
... Client-Accept (Client-Type = 0, Integrity-TLS) <TLS handshake ...
... Integrity-TLS) <TLS handshake> C/S: <...further messages...> ...
... A PEP requiring the Integrity-TLS object in a Client-Accept message MUST close the connection ...
... Client-Accept message MUST close the connection if the Integrity-TLS object is missing. The ensuing Client-Close message MUST include the error code ...
... signal the PEP to start the TLS handshake, the PDP MUST include the ...
... handshake, the PDP MUST include the Integrity-TLS object in the Client-Accept message. ...
... Upon receiving the Client-Accept message with the Integrity-TLS object, the PEP SHOULD initiate the TLS handshake ...
... Client-Accept message with the Integrity-TLS object, the PEP SHOULD initiate the TLS handshake. If for any reason the PEP ...
... Client-Accept (Client-Type = 0, Integrity-TLS) <TLS handshake ...
... Integrity-TLS) <TLS handshake> C/S: <...further messages...> ...
... Client-Accept, the PEP MUST NOT send any messages until the TLS handshake is complete. Upon receiving any message from ...
... receiving any message from the PEP before the TLS handshake starts, the PDP ...


... TLS provides facilities to securely close its connections. Reception of a valid ...
... closure alert assures an implementation that no further data will arrive on that connection. The TLS specification requires TLS implementations to initiate a closure alert ...
... connection. The TLS specification requires TLS implementations to initiate a closure alert exchange before closing a connection ...
... closure alert exchange before closing a connection. It also permits TLS implementations to close connections without waiting to receive closure alerts ...
... provided they send their own first. A connection closed in this way is known as an "incomplete close". TLS allows implementations to reuse the session in this case, but COPS ...
... reuse the session in this case, but COPS/TLS makes no use of this capability. ...
... security of the data already received, but simply indicates that subsequent data might have been truncated. Because TLS is oblivious to COPS message boundaries, it is necessary to examine the COPS ...


... All PEP implementations of COPS/TLS MUST support an access control mechanism to identify authorized PDPs. This requirement ...
... PEP deployments SHOULD require the use of this access control mechanism for operation of COPS over TLS. When access control is enabled, the PEP ...
... enabled, the PEP implementation MUST NOT initiate COPS/TLS connections to systems not authorized as PDPs by the access control mechanism. ...
... Similarly, PDP COPS/TLS implementations MUST support an access control mechanism permitting them to restrict their services to ...
... PDP implementation MUST terminate COPS/TLS connections from unauthorized PEP systems and log an error if an auditable logging mechanism is ...
... Implementations of COPS/TLS MUST use X.509 v3 certificates conforming ...
... PDP and PEP systems. COPS/TLS systems MUST perform certificate verification processing conforming to [RFC3280 ...
... register with a certificate authority, and COPS over TLS uses one-way authentication, of the PDP to the PEP ...
... end entity certificates [RFC3280]. In this case, COPS over TLS uses two-way authentication, and the PDP ...
... Generally, COPS/TLS requests are generated by the PEP consulting bootstrap ...
... identity as presented in the PDP's TLS Certificate message. In some cases, the bootstrap ...


... Implementations MUST support the TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ...


... PDP SHOULD be backward compatible with peers that have not been modified to support COPS/TLS. They SHOULD handle errors generated in response to the Integrity-TLS object. ...
... COPS/TLS. They SHOULD handle errors generated in response to the Integrity-TLS object. ...


... C-Num, C-Type combination for the Integrity-TLS object to the registry at http://www.iana.org/assignments/cops-parameters: ...
... 0x10 0x02 Message Integrity, Integrity-TLS [RFC4261prop] ...
... Client-Type 0, the IANA has added the following Flags value for the Integrity-TLS object: 0x01 = StartTLS ...
... security 15 16 2 Integrity-TLS supported/preferred Further values for the Flags field ...


... COPS PDP and PEP MUST check the results of the TLS negotiation to see whether an acceptable degree of authentication and privacy ...
... A man-in-the-middle attack can be launched by deleting the Integrity-TLS object or altering the Client-Open or Client-Accept messages. If security ...
... Client-Open or Client-Accept messages that fail to include an Integrity-TLS object. ...


... document [RFC2818] that specifies how HTTP runs over TLS. Discussions ...


... Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246prop(-> 4346prop), January 1999. ...
... Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. ...
... Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP ...



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