RFC 4367:What's in a Name: False Assumptions about...
RFC-Ref

service


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... Domain Name System (DNS) [1] provides an essential service on the Internet, mapping structured names to a variety of different types of data. Most often it is used to obtain the IP address of a host ...
... registered trademarks, company names, types of services, and so on. Such identifiers serve many business purposes, including extension of brand, advertising, ...
... and so on. People often make assumptions about the type of service that is or should be provided by a host associated with that name, based on ...
... 8], the requests for creation of TLDs associated with mobile devices and services, and even phishing attacks ...
... context, an "assumption" is defined as any behavior that is expected when accessing a service at a domain name, even though the behavior is not explicitly codified in protocol specifications ...


... | DNS | |Service | | | +--------+ ...
... DNS is used by applications. A user of the application obtains an identifier for particular content or service it wishes to obtain. This identifier is often a URL or URI ...
... software and/or hardware system) that contacts a server for that application in order to provide service to the user. To do that, it contacts a DNS server to resolve the domain name ...
... >From this model, it is clear that three entities in the system can potentially make false assumptions about the service provided by the server. The human user may form expectations relating to the content ...
... by the server. The human user may form expectations relating to the content of the service based on a parsing of the host name from which the content originated. The server might assume that the client connecting ...


... the user receives some kind of an error. This represents a total interoperability failure, manifesting itself as a lack of service to users of the system. Unfortunately, this kind of failure persists. Repeated attempts over time by the client ...
... persists. Repeated attempts over time by the client to access the service will fail. Only a change in the server or client software can fix this problem. ...
... user reset). If this failure occurs in a server, not only will the connecting client lose service, but other clients attempting to connect will not get service ...
... service, but other clients attempting to connect will not get service. As an example, if a web server assumes that content passed to it from a client ...
... client accessing a streaming media service may receive content of very low bitrate, even though the client supported better codecs ...


... assumption that a server within a particular domain will provide a specific type of service. Sub-delegation and evolution, both discussed below, can make these assumptions wrong. ...
... Indeed, this leakage is a strength of the Internet architecture, not a weakness. It enables global access to services from any client with a connection ...
... Internet. That, in turn, allows for rapid growth in the number of customers for any particular service. ...
... authorities, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain any kind of central control on the nature of the service provided in each sub-domain. ...
... registration of multiple domains in which a particular service is to run. As an example, a service provider with the name "example" might register ...
... domains in which a particular service is to run. As an example, a service provider with the name "example" might register and set up its services ...
... service provider with the name "example" might register and set up its services in "example.com", "example.net", and generally example.foo for each foo that is a valid ...
... particular protocol in a particular domain, indicating that the service is available on some port, that the service ...
... service is available on some port, that the service is, in fact, running there. This assumption could be wrong because the SRV records haven't been updated by the system administrators ...
... wrong because the SRV records haven't been updated by the system administrators to reflect the services currently running. As another example, a client might assume that a particular domain policy ...


... clients, servers, and users should not make assumptions on the nature of the service provided to, or by, a domain. More specifically, however, the following can be said: ...


... well-known aliases that can be used to construct domain names for reaching various well-known services in a domain. This approach was later followed by the definition of a new resource record ...
... resource record, the SRV record [2], which specifies that a particular service is running on a server in a domain. Although both of these ...
... server in a domain. Although both of these mechanisms are useful as a hint that a particular service is running in a domain, both of them represent assumptions that may be false. ...
... 2782prop, an SRV record for a particular service would be present only by explicit choice of the domain administrator ...
... assumes that the corresponding host provides this service would be wrong only because of human error in configuration. In this case, ...
... the assumption is less likely to be wrong, but it certainly can be. The only way to determine with certainty that a service is running on a host is to initiate a connection ...
... host is to initiate a connection to the port for that service, and check. Implementations need to be careful not to codify any behaviors that cause failures should the information provided in the ...


... availability and usage (or lack thereof) of certain security protocols and algorithms. For example, a client accessing a service in a particular domain might assume a specific authentication algorithm ...
... can result in interoperability failures, or worse yet, providing service in an insecure way, even though the client asked for, and thought it would get, secure service ...
... service in an insecure way, even though the client asked for, and thought it would get, secure service. These kinds of assumptions are fundamentally unsound even if the records themselves are secured with DNSSEC ...


... Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782prop, February 2000. ...
... Hamilton, M. and R. Wright, "Use of DNS Aliases for Network Services", BCP 17, RFC 2219, October 1997. ...



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